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Abstract  
The involvement of members of owners’ families in the running of large family businesses in Mexico is decreasing. 
Although family members still hold key posts such as that of CEO, other executive posts tend to be delegated to 
professional salaried managers. Top managers, including family members, share some common characteristics. They 
are young compared with managers in other developed countries, their quality as human resources is high, and many 
of them are graduates of overseas MBA courses. Most of them are sufficiently experienced. Improvement of quality 
among top managers is a recent phenomenon in Mexico, and has been encouraged mainly by the following two 
factors. First, globalization of business activities was promoted by intense competition among firms under conditions 
of market liberalization.  In order to equip themselves with the ability to cope with the globalization of their 
operations, large family businesses tried hard to improve the quality of top management, by training and educating 
existing managers, and/or by recruiting managers in the outside labor market. Second, developments in the Mexican 
economy during the 1990s led to a growth in the labor market for top managers Thus, business restructuring caused by 
bankruptcy, as well as mergers and acquisitions, privatization and so on, led to the dismissal of business managers who 
then entered the labor market in large numbers. The increasing presence of these managers in the labor market helped 
family businesses to recruit well-qualified senior executives. 
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Executive Managers  
in Large Mexican Family Businesses 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the attributes of top managers who are in charge of the 
running of operations in large family businesses in Mexico and to illustrate the process by which 
such attributes were obtained as a means for competing in the globalizing economy. 
In studies of business history, it has long been argued that a separation of ownership and 
management is an inevitable development in family firms when they drive for growth (Berle and 
Means [1932], Chandler [1990]). It has also been argued that, because of the narrowness of the 
family as a source of managerial human resources, a transformation of family businesses into firms 
managed by professional salaried managers is unavoidable if growth is to take place [Morikawa, 
1996].  Despite the convincing argument that there needs to be a separation of ownership and 
management, a recent empirical study has shown that large firms controlled by the owner’s family 
are widely found around the world (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer [1999], Colli [2003]) 
and are prevalent especially in developing countries (Amsden [2000]). Their survival suggests that 
some measures have been adopted by large family businesses to escape from the constraints of 
managerial human resources.  
In a previous study, the author identified two measures taken by large family businesses of Asia 
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and Latin America to escape from the constraints of scarce managerial human resources. One is the 
enhancement of the managerial capacity of owner families through education and training, and the 
other is the appointment of professional salaried managers to a wide range of top managerial 
positions (Hoshino[2004a]).  The author has argued that the professionalization of management in 
family businesses in Asia and Latin America has advanced in the sense that management is in the 
hands of those who have professional knowledge and who have followed a well-developed 
business career, even though the control of management rests with owner families.  The questions 
that then arise are the nature of the attributes of these professional managers and how such 
attributes are attained.  The purpose of this paper is to answer these questions, focusing on the 
case of large Mexican family businesses.   
The study of the attributes of top executive managers provides insights into the ability of family 
businesses to survive. It involves an evaluation of quality of managerial human resources which 
may or may not be adequate for survival in a competitive environment. Moreover a study of this 
kind illustrates the extent to which the owner family can sustain its control over management.    
The quality of top managers is considered to be a determining factor in the growth of the firm 
(Penrose [1959]).  Since the 1980s, the economic environment in which family businesses must 
operate has changed drastically. The globalization of the economy has not only brought about an 
increasing competition among firms, but has also opened up new business opportunities. For a 
family business to survive the fierce competition and to grow by seizing these opportunities, it is 
essential to employ capable top managers. We will see whether large family businesses in Mexico 
are endowed with such human resources. As regards the criteria for demonstrating the capability of 
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managers, educational background and professional career are used. The former reflects the level of 
managerial knowledge obtained formally, while the latter reflects the level of managerial skill 
accumulated through experience.     
So far as the control of the owner family over management is concerned, it is generally imagined 
that control is tightly held, an image which comes partly from the tangibility of the owner family 
and partly from the difficulty of obtaining information on managers.  That said, it would in any 
case be difficult for owners to participate in every managerial decision, and accordingly it is 
supposed that a managerial hierarchy is formed within the business organization and that some kind 
of responsibility for management is delegated to professional salaried managers.  It is hoped that 
an analysis of the management of family business, focusing on managers who take charge of 
ordinary business operations, will show the extent and the nature of the control exercised by owners 
over the management of family businesses. 
Very few studies refer to managers of Mexican family businesses1. As far as this author knows, 
there exist only those studies which analyzed the top managers of large family businesses in the 
early 1970s (Derossi [1977] and Andrews [1976]). The principal reason for the absence of studies 
has been the difficulty of gaining access to information on managers. Accessibility was drastically 
improved in 2002, when the annual reports2 of listed companies, which are submitted to the 
                                                  
1 Mexican large family businesses have been studied by Pozas [1993], Garrido [1998, 
1999], Cerutti [2000], Hoshino [2001] and Pozas [2002].  These studies analyze 
mainly the changes that have been apparent in business activities under economic 
globalization since the 1980s and do not focus on the management developments that 
induced these changes.  The ownership structure of Mexican large family businesses, 
which is a requisite condition for control of management, has been analyzed by Babatz 
[1997] and Hoshino [2005] , while the extent of owner family’s assumption of a 
managerial position has been examined by Hoshino [2004b]. 
2 Its official name is Reporte anual que se presenta de acuerdo con las disposiciones de 
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National Banking and Securities Commission (Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores, CNBV) 
of Federal Government , began to be put on the Internet home page of the Mexican Stock Exchange 
(Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, BMV).  The analysis offered in this paper is based principally on 
data derived from the annual reports of family-run major listed companies submitted to CNBV in 
July 2004.   
 The analysis consists of three parts. In part I, the 28 largest family businesses in Mexico, which 
are the subject of analysis, are presented and a brief description is provided concerning their 
characteristics as family businesses.  In part II, the profiles of the executive managers of these 
family businesses are examined by means of analysis of their career data as presented in the annual 
reports of major listed companies of the 28 family businesses. In part III, in order to see how the 
profiles were shaped, we will explain the economic conditions surrounding the development of 
family businesses.  It will be suggested that since the 1980s, because of an unstable and 
competitive business environment, qualified salaried managers have become indispensable for 
business survival, and the ability of those who were appointed to top manager’s positions in family 
businesses has improved considerably.   The paper concludes by presenting the principal findings 
of the study.  
 
I. The 28 Largest Family Businesses 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
character general aplicables a las emisoras de valores y a otros participantes de 
mercado de valores.    When the source of information is these annual reports, the 
data source is omitted for the sake of convenience.   
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This study focuses on the 28 largest family businesses which were analyzed by this author in a 
previous examination of the managerial positions assumed by owner families (Hoshino [2004b]). 
Appendix 1 lists these 28 family businesses and gives some basic information on them, including 
the owner family’s name, the major listed companies and the principal activities of each business. 
Appendix 2 explains the process by which these 28 family businesses were extracted for study.      
 According to previous studies undertaken by this author, these 28 largest family businesses share 
the following peculiarities in ownership and management (Hoshino [2004b], Hoshino [2005]). First, 
the ownership of firms is generally structured like a pyramid, with a holding company at its apex 
and various strata of subsidiary firms beneath.  Owner families hold the majority of the voting 
shares in the apex company, and this enables them to control the management of the whole pyramid 
of businesses. In many cases, the companies at the apex of the pyramid are identical to major listed 
companies.  Second, the presence of the owner family is apparent on the board of directors of the 
apex company, which is the superior decision making organ of the whole group. The post of 
chairman of the board of the apex company is always held by a leading member of the owner 
family.  Although other family members also hold various directorships on the board, their 
number does not always constitute a majority. Third, the General Law of Commercial Companies 
(Ley general de sociedades mercantiles) provides that the board of directors can designate officers 
who may help directors in the conduct of business operations.  In reality, the responsibility for 
business operations is delegated to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO, Director General in Spanish) 
of the apex company and the other top managers beneath him. The presence of the owner family is 
minor in these posts compared with its presence on the board of directors.  Although the post of 
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CEO is often held concurrently by the chairman of the board and by the family member regarded as 
successor to the actual leader, there also exist cases in which salaried managers are appointed to the 
position of CEO. Relatively few owner family members hold top managerial posts other than that 
of CEO.   
 The managerial position of those analyzed in this study is that of top executive manager 
(funcionario in Spanish) including the CEO. The career data of these individuals are presented in 
the annual reports of listed companies submitted to CNBV in July 2004.  Although there are minor 
differences as regards the range of posts referred to as funcionario among companies, in most cases 
the description refers to the CEO and the other officers (director in Spanish) of the apex company, 
which functions as the headquarters of the pyramidal structure, as well as the CEOs of important 
subsidiaries. Hereafter, we will simply use the term “top manager” for funcionario. The director of 
the board is not included. Principal items of career data for each top manager, available from the 
annual report of listed companies, are name, actual managerial position, date of birth or age, 
educational history, year of entry to the company concerned, year promoted to present post, 
previous employment, and remuneration. 
  Top managers from owner families are included in the data.  Of the 410 top managers covered 
in this study, 54 (26 COEs and 28 officers) were owner family members. The following analysis 
does not treat family and non- family separately because the purpose of the study is to discover 
whether top management positions are staffed by those who may be regarded as qualified persons. 
The author has analyzed elsewhere the attributes of CEOs from the owner family. Briefly, her study 
reveals that they have a high educational level and that their work experience is sufficient for the 
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post they hold.  Of 19 CEOs whose educational data are available, all are university graduates, 16 
being  Master’s degree holders, of whom 13 possess Master’s degrees awarded by foreign 
universities.  Of the 21 CEOs whose work career data are available, at least 14 had work 
experience inside or outside the family business before they were promoted to the CEO post.  
Their average age is 49 (Hoshino [2004b:20,35]). As we shall see later, these attributes are identical 
to those of the top managers analyzed in the following survey. 
A shortcoming of the career data presented in annual reports is that their form varies from 
company to company, with the result that although the total number of top managers covered in the 
study amounts to 410, the sets of data on individual career items fall far short of this figure (see 
Appendix, Table 1). Because of this problem, the profiles of top managers will be traced by 
synthesizing the analysis using different sets of career-related data. 
 
II. Profile of Top Managers of Mexican Large Family Businesses 
 
１．Actual Age, Year of Entrance, Age of Entrance  
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the actual ages reported for 230 top managers of 28 family 
businesses. According to the table, the ages cover a wide range, in most cases from the middle 
thirties to the middle fifties. The oldest top manager is 75 years old and the youngest 31. The 
average age is 49, which means that they are relatively young compared with the top managers of 
developed countries (Fukao & Morita [1997], Cappelli & Hamori [2004]). Table 2 lists the average 
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ages of the top managers of family businesses among the major listed companies.  The table 
reveals large differences in age among companies.  Those companies whose top managers are 
relatively old are ALFA、PENOLES, and HERDEZ、while those with relatively young managers are 
GCARSO、AMX、TELMEX、GFINBUR、ELEKTRA, and SABA. A common characteristic of the 
former companies is that they belong to old-established family businesses which had developed up 
until the 1970s as part of the process of import substitution industrialization in Mexico.  The 
enterprises with younger managers are companies of the newly-emerging family businesses that 
grew rapidly during the 1980s and thereafter.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of years of entrance to companies in respect of 292 top managers. 
It is clear that there is a wide variation as regards years of entry.  During the last quarter century 
Mexico has experienced repeated cycles of economic boom and crisis, beginning with the oil boom 
during the late seventies and early eighties, followed by the foreign debt crisis which began in 1982, 
the emerging market boom of the early nineties and the Mexican currency crisis of 1994-95.  The 
temporal variation in numbers of managers entering companies shows increases during boom years 
and decreases during years of crisis. The exception is the first peak in the number of entries during 
the early seventies, a development that is not simply the result of a sudden increase in economic 
growth. In an attempt to promote further industrialization the Mexican government in 1973 
introduced legislation which encouraged Mexican entrepreneurs to diversify their activities and 
form industrial groups (Hoshino[1990: 311-312]、DESC[1998: 70-75]).  The peak of entries in the 
early seventies is possibly due to the redefinition and expansion of business activities encouraged 
by this legislation, and the consequent increase in demand for managerial human resources in 
 8 
11
」
t
∋
9
人
 
 
Z
L
 
 
サ
ー
 
 
 
12
old-established family businesses.   
From the actual age and the year of entrance into companies of the same top manager, we can 
calculate his age of entrance to companies.  Table 3 shows the figures thus obtained in respect of 
153 top managers whose data were available for analysis. The table shows that some 75 individuals 
entered companies while in their twenties.  This means that almost a half of the 153 surveyed 
entered their respective companies after graduating from university or postgraduate school, and/or 
after working for a few years in other companies.  The remainder entered their company while in 
their thirties or at a later age, which means they entered after working in another company (or 
companies) for several years or more, and were promoted thereafter from middle to top managerial 
positions, or were recruited directly to top management.  The table shows a small peak in the 
second half of the forties, which, considering the overall average age of 49, seems to represent 
those who were directly recruited as top managers.  Table 3 also provides the age of entrance by 
companies. It is clear from the table that in some companies, managers are mainly in their twenties, 
which possibly indicates the presence of a clear principle as regards human resource administration, 
by which top managers are promoted internally from those who joined the company at a young age.  
Such companies are ALFA、VITRO、BIMBO、NADRO、and GISSA, which all belong to the 
category of old-established family businesses.   As regards the other companies, the ages of 
entrance are dispersed, which means that in these companies, the principles concerning human 
resource administration are not as firmly established as in those in the group of old-established 
companies.  
From information on the year of entering the company and the year of promotion to the present 
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position of the same top manager, we can calculate the number of years in the company needed to 
become a top manager. Figure 2 shows the distribution of 96 top managers. Those recruited into the 
company as top managers, individuals who are shown on the horizontal axis of the figure as zero in 
terms of the years needed for promotion, amount to 13, a number which is not so large in absolute 
terms, although it is the category with the biggest number of individuals. As the figure shows, most 
individuals were appointed as top managers after accumulating experience within the company.  
The number of years needed to attain top managerial position are widely dispersed, which means 
that an entrance into the company is possible at every level in the managerial hierarchy.  This fact 
suggests the existence of a well developed external labor market in managers   
 
2. Education 
 
Table 4 shows the educational level of 150 top managers for whom information on education was 
available.  According to the Table, all of them hold a Bachelor’s degree or its equivalent, and more 
than a half of them, 83 in number, have a Master’s degree.  Some 16 top managers completed 
special courses of business administration at university business schools.  These data indicate a 
high level of education.  The names of the universities at which these managers studied are given 
in Table 5.  The most frequently attended Mexican university among the top managers is ITESM
（Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey）. Although generally speaking, 
public universities in Mexico, especially UNAM（Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México）
which is located in the capital, have significant importance in terms of the number of their students, 
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the scale of their budgets, and their political and social influence, their role in the education of top 
managers is relatively small.  Those managers who graduated from public universities are in a 
minority, accounting for 19 of 68 top managers excluding those who studied in other Mexican 
universities and abroad.  More than half of the Master’s courses taken by the managers, not taking 
into account those for whom data are unavailable, were taught at universities overseas..  The 
overseas universities most attended among the managers were Stanford (8 individuals), Harvard (4 
individuals) and Texas (3 individuals).  Graduates of Mexican Master’s courses studied mainly at 
ITESM and IPADE (Instituto Panamericano de Alta Dirección de Empresa). As regards those who 
attended special courses attached to universities, 8 studied at IPADE, 2 at Stanford, and 6 at other 
foreign universities.  A salient feature of the data is the importance of foreign universities, and 
especially American ones, in the formation of the top managers of Mexican family businesses. 
Table 6 shows the specialties that the 150 top managers studied at university. The table reveals that 
their specialties, although diverse at the Bachelor’s degree level, were concentrated at Master’s 
level in business administration.     
 Both ITESM and IPADE are institutions of higher education that were established through the 
initiatives of Mexican entrepreneurs.  The headquarters of ITESM are located at Monterrey, an 
industrial city and the capital of the north eastern state of Nuevo Leon. The person who took the 
lead in establishing ITESM was Eugenio Garza Sada, a leader of the second generation of the 
family that founded the Monterrey Group, which holds the second position in the Table 1.  ITESM 
was established in 1943 with the purpose of educating engineers and business managers for those 
industries which were constrained at that time by a serious lack of human resources.  It is said that 
 11 
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the model of ITESM that Garza Sada had in mind was the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
（Mendirichaga[1982: 38]）.    
IPADE, another institution of higher education that specializes in business administration, was 
established in 1967 under the auspices of the Mexico City business community.  The principal 
promoter of the project was Manuel Senderos, who was the founder of DESC, which holds 
eleventh position in Table 1.  He took as his model the Harvard Business School.  IPADE was 
integrated in 1980 into Universidad Panamericana, a private university, and became its affiliated 
business school. Both ITESM and IPADE have evolved into highly respected business schools and 
these days occupy high positions in international rankings of MBA3 courses. A laborious but 
urgently needed venture for educating Mexican managers has at last borne fruit. 
  The above analysis makes clear the propensity of top managers to take American-style MBA 
courses, either in American universities or in Mexican universities that have been modeled on 
American examples. This means that as is the case in most other countries, top managers in Mexico 
have been trained by way of American-.style business management courses.           
 
3. Previous Employment  
 
The preceding description shows that some top managers have past work experience in other 
companies. From information on previous employment available for 102 individuals, we can 
                                                  
3 According to a survey carried out by the Wall Street Journal and Harris Interactive in 
2005, ITESM and IPADE were ranked respectively 9th and 5th out of 47 MBA course 
providers in the North American region (Wall Street Journal [2005]). 
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identify the characteristics of the inter-firm movement of top managers. These are presented in 
Table 7.   The table classifies the firms in which the managers were previously employed by the 
nature of their capital or their activities. According to the table, there were 12 cases of movement 
between firms within the same family business group. In the case of Carso, ranked first in Table 1, 
eight transfers were recorded, which suggests the existence of an inner labor market for top 
managers within the group. Some 90 transfers (categories II to VI inclusive in the Table) are 
movements from firms other than the family business in which the manager is at present employed. 
Out of these 90 cases, 14 were transfers between firms affiliated to the 28 family businesses 
covered in this study. Another characteristic of the patterns of movement shown in the table is an 
abundance of individuals from the financial sector, which amount to 17 in number.  Of these 17, 
some 14 were transfers within the financial sector. Finance is one of the economic sectors that have 
undergone drastic restructuring during the last quarter century.  The process began in 1982 with 
the nationalization of private banks,  which were re-privatized in 1990-91, and includes the 
massive bankruptcies and incidences of M & A by foreign banks after the 1994 Mexican Currency 
Crisis.  It is likely that during this turbulent process, the fluidity of employment increased, a 
development that is reflected in the frequency of movement in the financial sector.  
 
4. Remuneration 
 
Insofar as it is presented in aggregate rather than individual amounts, the information contained 
in annual reports on the remuneration of top managers differs from the data used in the preceding 
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parts of the analysis.  Moreover, the criteria on remuneration vary from firm to firm, with some 
firms giving information only on top managers, and others reporting on both top managers and 
board directors. Yet other firms provide only the basis of the remuneration, without details of the 
payment itself. Here, we will confine ourselves to general characteristics of remuneration, using 
these three kinds of information.  
Table 8 shows data on the aggregate amount of the remuneration received by top managers. 
When both the aggregate amounts paid and the total number of those paid are given, we can obtain 
the average amount paid per person.  The results of this calculation are: P$6.6 millions for Alfa, 
P$3.01 millions for Cydsa, P$2.2 millions for Gigante, P$1.47 millions for SALINAS, and 
P$0.36millions for TMM (the monthly average exchange rate in December 2003 was about P$11 
per 1 US $).  These figures reveal that top managers are paid fairly well considering the Mexican 
standard of living, and the amounts given to them increase in proportion to expansion of the scale 
of business. 
Table 9 profiles the aggregate amount of the remuneration paid to directors of the board or to 
directors and top managers, or the basis of payment to directors.  When we compare the amounts 
of remuneration given to directors and those given to top managers, some interesting features of the 
remuneration system become apparent.  First, for companies whose data are available on both 
aggregate amounts of directors and number of directors, the average amount of remuneration can 
be calculated. The results of the calculation are: P$0.175 millions for AMX, P$0.22 millions for 
FEMSA, P$0.025 for TVAZTCA, P$0.333 millions for ELEKTRA, and P$0.5 millions for 
LIVEPOL.  Although these amounts are far from insignificant, they are smaller by one whole 
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digit compared with the payments given to top managers.  Moreover, a similar feature is evident in 
the descriptions given in the annual reports on the basis of payment for directors of the board.  For 
example, in the case of ALFA, the remuneration given to directors of the board consists of a fixed 
annual payment as well as a payment for attendance at meetings. The former amounts to 8 
Centenario gold coins, which had a market value of about P$5 thousand per coin in 2004, and the 
latter amounts to 5 or 4 gold coins for each attendance, depending on the character of the meeting.  
Let us suppose that meetings of the board are held once a month and that a director attends every 
meeting. In this case his annual remuneration would amount to P$0.34 million including the fixed 
payment he receives as a board director. This shows that payment to directors is really an 
honorarium in nature.   The same conclusion can be drawn from Table 9 which also presents 
aggregate amounts paid to directors and top managers. Compared with the figures of payments to 
directors, these amounts are larger by one or two digits, a difference which probably can be 
explained by including the remuneration paid to top managers. 
Some listed companies give information in their Annual Reports on how the remuneration given 
to top managers is calculated. Often, a top manager’s work is evaluated according to how far he has 
attained the goal which has been set for him beforehand.  A general tendency is for 
institutionalization to develop by means of the formation within the company of a section that 
specializes in evaluation and remuneration, the setting up of criteria of evaluation, and the 
consultation with market quotations, although the influence of the owner family over the final 
decision on remuneration is thought to be large. 
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The preceding analysis provides us with a profile of the typical top manager of a Mexican family 
business. He is relatively young, highly educated and familiar with the American style of business 
management. He is also very well paid. There exist three kinds of route to the position of top 
manager. One way ahead is for a manager to enter a family business at the start of his professional 
career and to be promoted internally thereafter. Another is for a manager to enter a family business 
after accumulating work experience elsewhere and to be promoted from the middle ranks thereafter.  
The third approach is for a manager to be recruited directly to the top position. The preferred route 
to the top among managers varies from business to business. A general trend is for the share of 
internally promoted top mangers to be higher in old-established family businesses than in newly 
emerging ones.  The existence of managers who entered their firm after accumulating work 
experience and the various patterns of their movements between companies points to the formation 
of a labor market among top managers. In the following part we will provide some explanatory 
background on the shaping of career profiles by examining the changing condition of the Mexican 
economy since the 1980s.   
 
III. Restructuring of Family Business and Emergence of Salaried Managers 
 
１．Rising Educational Level and Demand for Qualified Managers 
Derossi [1977] carried out an interview survey of 200 top managers of Mexican industries, 
including both owner managers and salaried ones, in 1969 in order to identify their characteristics 
from a sociological point of view.  Her study provides us with a profile of top managers during the 
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final stage of import substitution industrialization in Mexico.   
The data on education produced by her survey consist of information on 143 individuals, 
including 43 who were founders of their business, 32 who were successors of the family business, 
and 68 who were salaried managers. The percentages of university graduates in each category were 
56%, 79% and 66% respectively. At the time of the survey, the main indicator of the level of final 
education was possession of a university Bachelor’s degree,  postgraduate education being not yet 
a factor that could be taken into account.   
The testimonies of 50 top managers, included by Derossi in her book, reveal several interesting 
facts. First, we can observe the formation of a managerial hierarchy in companies which had 
rapidly developed during the process of industrialization.  In two companies whose labor force 
amounted to between one and two hundred, two strata of managerial hierarchy, namely top 
management and junior management, were evident. In three companies with labor forces of 
between one and two thousand the three strata of top, middle and low could be observed4.  In the 
testimonies, we can find a significant observation by one top manager of a company with three 
strata, who said that the era of managers who act on instinct had already ended and the era of 
professional managers had begun.  Second, at that time there existed companies which were not 
foreign owned but were managed by salaried managers. These were companies whose principal 
stockholders were the national private banks.  Before their nationalization in 1982, private banks 
which were not affiliated to family businesses, such as Bancomer and Banamex, included numerous 
                                                  
4 See numbers 9, 37,39, 41, and 48 of the testimonies. The titles of office in companies 
with three strata are director general, director, and subgerente（or gerente）; in 
companies with two strata, the Spanish terms director general and gerentes（or 
gerente superior）are used.  
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companies in their portfolios. It could well be the case that management of these companies was 
delegated to salaried managers.  In one of the testimonies, Banamex is described as the 
shareholder of the company concerned5.  At present, companies owned by private banks have 
mostly disappeared because of the aforementioned drastic restructuring of the financial sector .   
With regard to the level of education of top managers in the 1980s, we can find various figures in 
the articles of Expansión, a Mexican business journal.  One of these articles deals with the results 
of a survey, conducted by ITESM and a private consulting company in 1981, which covered 1076 
managers.  The average profile portrayed in this survey is that of a manager aged 40 years, with 
nine years spent in the company, having changed employment three times, and with a position in 
the second strata from the top, or the third stratum in the case of large company, in the management 
hierarchy.  Although it seems that middle  managers were included in the scope of the survey, it 
still clear that the educational level of managers had risen considerably.  Of the total 1076 
managers, 86 % had attended Bachelor’s degree courses, 30% held Master’s degrees, and 3% held 
doctorates  (56%, 27%, 3% respectively, when described by the final level of education). The 
remaining 14% did not attend university. With regard to the Bachelor’s degree courses taken by the 
managers, 90% were located in Mexico and 54% were at private universities, of which the most 
frequently attended was ITESM.  Some 51 % of the managers had taken courses in business 
administration and 36 % in engineering.  Concerning the Master’s courses, 90% were located in 
Mexico, and 90% were at private universities（Expansión [1981, May 27:433]）. 
 More recent figures can be found in a 1997 article of Expansión, which deals with the attributes 
                                                  
5 See numbers 39 and 41 of the testimonies. 
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of a representative 100 executive managers in Mexico.  Of these, 24% were foreigners employed 
in foreign companies. According to the article, as the regards the final level of education; 56% of 
the executive managers possessed Bachelor’s degrees, 35% were Master’s graduates, and 2% held 
doctorates (data for the remaining 7% were not available). In addition, 34% of the managers had 
attended special courses.  With respect to specialty, at Bachelor’s degree level, 44% of the courses 
that had been taken were in administration and accounting and 39% were in engineering.  Of the 
Master’s courses, administration and accounting made up 74% and engineering 16%.  Because of 
the inclusion of foreigners in the data, some 49% of the managers covered by the survey had 
studied abroad.  However 36% of Mexicans, also, had studied abroad.  Of those who studied in 
Mexico, 53% went to private universities. ITESM accounted for 35%, while 37% graduated from 
UNAM (Expansión[1997a, Abril 9:22]) 
  Although strict comparison is difficult because of the variation in the range of managers covered 
by the surveys, from the facts mentioned above it seems safe to say that the educational level of 
managers has risen steadily from year to year.     
 Judging from articles in Expansión, we can conclude that the educational level of managers has 
risen in response to a growth in the demand of companies for qualified human resources, especially 
in the 1990s. One article in 1989 deals with a typical manager of the 1990s, whose ideal image is 
young, bilingual, a university graduate, and desirably the holder of an MBA (Expansión [1989, 
Abril 26:57]).  It should be stressed, however, that this was an ideal image and not necessarily the 
real one.  This situation changed in the 1990s. In another article which deals with the emergence 
of a new type of manager, executives were described as highly educated, with a good capability for 
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decision making, with a high adaptability, and with a cosmopolitan mentality (Expansión[1992, 
Nov.11:135]. In articles of 1994 and thereafter, the requisites of the sort of qualified manager who 
was being sought after by Mexican companies began to be portrayed more concretely. Besides a 
Master’s degree, which had by now become indispensable for gaining good-quality managerial 
employment,  the desired attributes of top Mexican executives have come to include fluent 
English, sufficient work experience, adaptability to different cultures, ability to work abroad, 
facility in computer use, and ability to engage in team work(Expansión [1994b,Nov.23:51] 
Expansión [1995b, Nov.22:84] Expansión [1996, Jul.17:42,49] Expansión [1997b,Nov.19:121-122] 
Expansión  [1998b, Nov.18:104] Expansión [1999, Nov.10-24:53] Expansión [2000a, Abr.12:54] 
Expansión  [2002, Ago.21-Sep.04:58]). These qualifications required of managers are coincident 
with those of top managers examined above, many of whom are holders of MBAs, have studied 
abroad and have accumulated work experience.  
  It would appear that the progress made by family companies in the globalization of business 
activities during the 1990s is the reason why the requirements for managerial employment in 
companies have become so demanding.   
 
2. Globalization of Business Activities, Shortage of Managerial Human Resources and Rising 
Remuneration 
 
The decades of the 1980s and 1990s were difficult years for family businesses in Mexico.  The 
foreign debt crisis of 1982 decisively put an end to the import substitution policy of 
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industrialization that had been pursued for almost forty years. As part and parcel of the neo-liberal 
economic reforms that were followed thereafter, trade liberalization and the relaxation of controls 
on foreign investment were implemented, developments that exposed family businesses to fierce 
competition from imported goods and multinational corporations entering Mexico.  As a result, 
several old family businesses quit the scene, having failed to compete and/or having been acquired 
by multinational corporations or rival family businesses. At the same time there emerged new 
family businesses which grew rapidly by exploiting the commercial opportunities brought by the 
economic reforms.  The 28 family businesses analyzed in this study are either old-established 
family businesses which survived the competition or newly-emerged family companies.  
A common characteristic shared by the old-established family businesses and the newly-emerged 
family firms is that both types of company are globalizing their activities in terms of markets, fund 
raising and inter-firm alliances. Both groups enjoy a high external market share as regards sales, are 
highly dependent on international fund raising including the issuance of stocks and bonds and the 
contracting of bank loans in international markets, and are constructing close links with foreign 
firms by means of developments such as joint ventures, technological assistance, and 
sub-contracting.  Family businesses began to globalize in the early 1990s when several of them 
listed their stocks on the New York Stock Exchange, and started foreign direct investment in the 
United States and in other Latin American countries (Hoshino [2001:7,13,15]).. 
It seems very likely that the globalization of business activities has brought with it a demand for 
new qualifications among senior managers.  These qualifications include the ability to plan 
corporate strategy, a good knowledge of marketing and corporate finance, the ability to negotiate in 
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foreign transactions, and a level of linguistic proficiency sufficient to carry out all these activities. 
The rising educational level of managers in general as well as the abundance of MBA holders and 
those (in 28 of the family businesses) who have studied abroad  reflect the new requirements of 
globalizing companies. 
People equipped with these qualifications are in short supply in Mexico and it may well be the 
case that the imbalance in supply and demand has pushed up the remuneration paid to managers.  
When the conditions of supply and demand bring about a movement in prices, we can expect the 
emergence of a market. We can discern several phenomena that suggest the existence of a labor 
market in managers in Mexico.  One is the increase in the number of head-hunting offices.  An 
article in Expansión reports that the number of such establishments increased in the second half of 
the 1990s and all of the 10 largest head-hunting offices in the world entered the Mexican market 
during the years before 1998 (Expansión [1998b, Nov.18:111]）. Another notable feature is the 
existence of quotations for managers’ remuneration.  Expansión reports the existence of 
consultancy offices which specialize in market research on managers’ remuneration, and the journal 
has even carried out, in cooperation with one of these offices, surveys on remuneration, and has 
edited special issues on the theme.  Third, there is frequent movement of top managers among 
firms, a development that has been observed in the second part of this paper.  We have seen in 
Figure 1 the pattern of distribution of years in which 291 top managers entered their companies.  It 
may well be the case that peaks in entrance numbers, as depicted in the figure, are years when the 
demand for managers increased.  The peak in the 1990s was in 1995, the year of the Mexican 
Currency Crisis. As regards the quotations of top managers’ remunerations, we can discern their 
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upwards trend in the pages of the aforementioned special issues of Expansión.  Table 10 presents 
the remuneration of CEOs in large companies, using information extracted from  issues of 
Expansión.  The table shows that although their remuneration increased in absolute terms 
throughout the period covered by the table, it underwent ups and downs in terms of constant prices.  
The shape of the wave in remuneration almost coincides with the wave in numbers entering 
companies, shown in Figure 1. Thus when the demand increases, the remuneration also goes up. 
These facts suggest that the market mechanism is functioning and that extravagant remuneration for 
top managers of family business reflected a dearth of highly qualified human resources. 
 
Conclusion  
 
The family company prevails around the world as a predominant form of business entity.  In 
order to throw light on the capacity for subsistence of such firms, the attributes of their top 
managers have been analyzed with particular reference to large Mexican family businesses.  As 
was explained in the introduction, our main concerns have been the extent to which large family 
companies in Mexico are staffed with qualified top managers who can ensure that businesses grow 
successfully under competitive conditions, as well as the extent and nature of control exercised by 
owners over the management of family businesses.  Insight into these issues may provide us with 
evidence for evaluating the capacity of family firms to survive.  As a way of concluding this paper, 
we would like to synthesize our findings concerning these two issues.           
If we extract from our findings the profile of the top managers of the 28 family businesses that 
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we have analyzed, we find that the typical manager is relatively young, highly educated, habituated 
to American-style business management, and highly remunerated.  It was during the 1990s that 
these characteristics became apparent among Mexican managers. The context of this change was 
intensification of competition, which encouraged family enterprises to globalize their business as a 
means of survival.  For the reorientation of their activities, they required qualified managers 
capable of globalizing their business operations, and this shaped the profile of top managers 
described above. In the careers of top managers, we can see a  difference between the 
old-established family businesses, which developed during the process of import-substitution 
industrialization, and the newly emerging and rapidly expanding family businesses, with the former 
category containing a higher percentage of those who entered young and were internally promoted 
to the top than the latter. An interpretation of this difference is as follows.  In the 1990s the labor 
market in top managers grew rapidly because of the increased fluidity of employment of managers 
fostered by large-scale business restructuring.  This development favored newly emerging family 
businesses which had an opportunity to directly recruit experienced managers in the labor market. 
Old-established family businesses, which already held a pool of human resources within them, 
recruited only those whom they needed. If we define a “qualified manager” as a manager with a 
high educational level and sufficient experience in business, we can safely say that the tendency 
among Mexican large family businesses is to be staffed with qualified managers.   
As regards the second issue, the rapid growth of a labor market in managers during the 1990s in 
Mexico and the growth of demand for managers seem suggest that it is impossible for a family 
company to manage a globalizing business unless it is equipped with salaried managers who have 
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knowledge and experience of business administration. The difference between top managers and 
board directors observed in the discussion of remuneration suggests a difference in participation in 
management in terms of both time and intensity, a situation that may produce an information gap 
between them. Although the board of directors has the final say in decision making, top managers 
can hold countervailing power based on the information gap. From this perspective, we can say that 
the control of the owner family is not as solid as it might otherwise seem. This conclusion makes us 
appreciate how important it is for the owner family to let their members participate in business 
operations.  The participation of owner family members as top managers can strengthen the 
control of the owner family over business and can thus stabilize the management of the family 
business, by closing the information gap between top managers and the board of directors and 
facilitating the communication between the two parties.  Without doubt, it will continue to be vital 
for the subsistence and growth of the family business for the owner family to recruit from their 
midst the qualified human resources described in this study. If they cannot provide them, and if the 
owner family retreats from direct participation in business operations, the control of the owner 
family will weaken, and its power of enforcement will fade.       
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Appendix 2. -Process of Extraction of the 28 Family Businesses   
 
The original data used in drawing up the list of businesses was the ranking of the largest 500 
firms, by sales, for the year 2000, as edited by the Mexican economics magazine Expansión [2001].  
As this ranking treats parent and subsidiary companies separately, subsidiaries were excluded and 
other information sources consulted, and a ranking of the largest 100 firms was then drawn up.  In 
the following stage, from the list of 100 firms, foreign firms and public firms (47 firms in total) and 
non-listed national private firms with limited available information (12 firms) were excluded.  
From the remaining 41 national private firms, those in bankruptcy (4 firms) and those that can 
hardly be regarded as family businesses (4 firms) were also excluded.  Of the remaining 33 firms, 
those owned or under the management control of the same owner family have been considered as 
one unit, and the resultant 28 firms and units have been re-ranked according to total sales.  
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